We study a competitive model in which debt-financed firms may default in some states of nature. Incomplete markets prevent firms from hedging the risk of asset firesales when markets are illiquid. This is the only friction in the model and the only cost of default. The anticipation of such losses alone may distort firms' investment decisions. We characterize the conditions under which competitive equilibria are inefficient and the form the inefficiency takes. We also show that endogenous financial crises may arise as a result of pure sunspot events. Finally, we examine alternative interventions to restore the efficiency of equilibria.
The Working Paper Series is availble only on line (www.dse.unive.it/pubblicazioni) For editorial correspondence, please contact:
wp.dse@unive.it
Introduction
Financial markets play an important role in the e¢ cient allocation of resources. One important function of …nancial markets is to provide the price signals that guide investment decisions. If the market price of a …rm is distorted, the …rm's investment decisions will also be distorted. In this paper we present a general equilibrium model in which debt-…nanced …rms face the risk of bankruptcy in some states of nature. 1 The price at which the …rm's assets can be liquidated in those states is one of the determinants of the present market value of the …rm. If those prices are liquidity constrained, the current market value of the …rm is reduced and that in turn will a¤ect current investment decisions.
The e¢ cient markets hypothesis requires, inter alia, that markets for …nancial assets are liquid, both in the sense that prices are insensitive to the volume of trades and in the sense that traders are not liquidity constrained. We investigate an environment where traders may be liquidity constrained and hence asset prices may also re ‡ect the amount of liquid assets in the buyers'possession, and not only the assets'future returns. Liquidity matters particularly in the event of default, where creditors are paid o¤ with the proceeds from the liquidation of the borrower's assets. In the absence of a liquid market, these assets may be sold at …resale prices, causing a signi…cant loss to the creditors. The anticipation of such a loss will in turn increase the cost of borrowing and reduce the …rm's initial investment. We consider the case where, besides this possible loss, there are no other costs of default and there are no other events where liquidity considerations matter.
The impact of anticipated defaults and illiquid asset markets is intimately tied up with the incompleteness of markets. We consider an environment where there are no commitment issues; hence, if markets are complete, there is no need for default in the …rst place. Borrowers and lenders can achieve whatever state-contingent incomes they want by trading contingent claims. As a consequence, when markets are complete, there is never a shortage of liquidity and assets are always e¢ ciently priced. By contrast, if the available debt instruments do not allow for state contingent payments, it is possible that in some states borrowers will have insu¢ cient resources to pay their debts. Further, there may be no way to hedge against capital losses resulting from default, in which case investment decisions may be distorted. Thus, incomplete markets, default and liquidity are jointly responsible for the distortion of prices and investment decisions.
To illustrate these ideas, we use a three-period model in which …rms owned by risk neutral entrepreneurs may undertake projects requiring an investment in the …rst period and producing output in the later periods. Entrepreneurs have no resources and must …nance their investment by issuing debt, which is purchased by a large set of identical consumers. The only uncertainty concerns the timing of output: the project undertaken by any entrepreneur will produce output in either the second or third period, but not both. This uncertainty about the timing of production together with the unavailability of contingent debt instruments are what generate the risk of default. An entrepreneur who is unable to repay or to renegotiate his debt is forced to default, liquidate his …rm's assets and give the proceeds to the creditors.
The crucial friction in our model arises from a "cash in advance" constraint. This constraint is binding only in the event of default. The bankruptcy code is assumed to require the resolution of the defaulted debt by means of an immediate payment to creditors in cash, not of an IOU for future payment. Hence, the assets of a defaulting …rm (its claims to present or future production) must be sold for cash and creditors are not allowed to use anticipated receipts from the bankruptcy proceedings as collateral to buy such assets in the market. As a consequence, …rms'asset prices are sometimes determined by the amount of cash in the market rather than by future earnings.
It is important to note that a …rm's revenue stream is una¤ected by default: if the …rm is sold for less than its fundamental value, the sellers' loss is the buyers' gain. Moreover, all consumers are identical, so that default does not even have an e¤ect on the distribution of wealth. 2 Hence, bankruptcy is always e¢ cient ex post and, since the representative consumer takes both sides of every trade being at the same time creditor and buyer of the …rms that are liquidated, his consumption is una¤ected by a …rm's liquidation. Nonetheless, a pro…t-maximizing entrepreneur, anticipating the …rm's loss of market value when the …rm is liquidated, will make ine¢ cient investment decisions.
The heart of the paper is the characterization of the conditions under which competitive equilibria are e¢ cient, that is, liquidity constraints do not bind, and of the consequences when they do bind. If the entrepreneurs who produce early default in equilibrium, there is no future output to sell and default does not generate any demand for liquidity in the asset market. We call this the case of no asset sales. Alternatively, if the entrepreneurs who default are late producers, their claims to future output have to be liquidated in order to pay "cash"to the creditors. If the liquidity available in the market is su¢ ciently high, the buyers will pay the fundamental value for the liquidated …rms. This is the case of a liquid market. But if the amount of liquidity is too low, there is an illiquid market and the market-clearing price will be liquidity-constrained, that is, lower than the fundamental value.
In the case of no asset sales or a liquid market, the liquidation value of the …rm is equal to its fundamental value and there is no distortion of investment decisions made at the …rst date. On the other hand, in the case of an illiquid market the …rm's value is liquidityconstrained and this will lead to distortions in the decisions made at the …rst date. The form this distortion takes is quite intuitive. Firms adjust their investment decisions, that is the project they choose, so that less ouput appears when they are in default (and forced to sell it at …re sale prices) and more when they are solvent and their creditors are able to buy up the assets of bankrupt …rms cheaply. In other words, they will choose more liquid projects, that produce more in the second period and less in the third period. Both tendencies reduce the roundaboutness of production and increase the liquidity of the asset market in the second period but at the same time distort investment decisions.
Even though there is no intrinsic aggregate uncertainty in the model, we show that it is possible to have endogenous …nancial crises as the result of purely extrinsic uncertainty (sunspots). Suppose that, at the beginning of the second period, agents observe the realization of a sunspot variable that a¤ects the equilibrium asset price. With some probability, the market value of late producing …rms is high and equal to the fundamental value, in which case there is no default, and with some probability the asset price collapses and late producers are forced to default. Suppose the probability that the price equals the fundamental is high. Investment decisions will then give little weight to the possibility of making capital gains when the asset price falls and, hence, will give little weight to providing liquidity to the asset market in the second period. This sets up the conditions for a self-ful…lling collapse in the asset price: a fall in the asset price causes …rms to default, this triggers demand for liquidity (through asset sales), but since the supply of liquidity is small, market clearing can only be restored by a large drop in the price at which assets can be sold. The probability of a collapse is small but, if it occurs, its e¤ects are extreme.
Having shown how market failures arise, we attempt to clarify the source of the ine¢ -ciency of equilibrium. We do this by considering three alternative ways in which the e¢ ciency of competitive equilibria can be restored. First, we show that the introduction of …rm-speci…c contingent securities removes the possibility of default and liquidation and makes the liquidity constraint always redundant. The introduction of such securities amounts, in e¤ect, to completing the market. Secondly, the removal of the cash-in-advance constraint present in the event of default (for instance by allowing the payment of creditors with IOUs) ensures that the market clearing price in the asset market is always equal to the fundamental value of the …rm. Finally, we show how the distortion of investment decisions can be corrected by the use of Pigovian taxes, that tax the adoption of more liquid projects and allow so to correct the distortion caused by liquidity-constrained asset prices.
Related literature. The e¤ect of liquidity on asset prices and its role as a source of …nancial crises has been studied by numerous authors. The e¤ect of "cash in the market pricing" in banking crises was …rst studied by Allen and Gale (1994) and related themes have been pursued in a series of papers (see, for example, Allen and Gale, 1978 , 2004a and 2004b . Diamond and Rajan (2000 ) also study liquidity in a banking context. By contrast, we focus on a purely market based economy in which there are no depository institutions and …rms take production decisions entirely …nanced by the issue of debt. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argued that the most likely buyers of the assets of a bankrupt …rm would be other …rms in the same industry. Since all …rms would likely be a¤ected by the same negative business cycle shocks, asset prices are likely to be low when a …rm has to be liquidated. They did not study the general equilibrium e¤ects of default or allow for other methods of …nancing asset sales.
Liquidity also a¤ects the …rms' investment decisions in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 2001) , who study models where moral hazard limits the pledgeable income of …rms. To ensure …rms'access to funds, the constraint that an appropriate share of the …rms'investment is in 'liquid', or pledgeable assets is thus imposed. In such framework, the …rm's future valuation plays then no role for its current investment decisions, the role of liquidity is also di¤erent and the liquidity needs are exogenous, only the liquidity premium is endogenously determined. Finally, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) study the e¤ect of ‡uctuations in the value of collateral on the …rm's ability to access liquidity.
The possibility of default in competitive environments is also investigated in various recent papers (see Kehoe and Levine (1993) , Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) for the …rst contributions). Some important di¤erences from our paper are the facts that default arises from a limited commitment problem (hence is also present when markets are complete) and liquidity issues play no role in the payments received by creditors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The primitives of the economy considered are laid out in Section 2. The investment and portfolio choices of …rms and consumers are described in Section 3, together with the decisions concerning the renegotiation of debt and default and the …rms' liquidation process. Competitive equilibria are then de…ned and some properties of consumers' and …rms' choices determined. This allows to obtain a simpler set of equilibrium conditions that is useful in the rest of the analysis. Section 4 characterizes the parameter values for which e¢ cient equilibria exist. Since an equilibrium is shown to always exist, the complementary set of parameters can only support an ine¢ cient equilibrium. The properties of these equilibria are analyzed in more detail in Section 5, where we show the consequences of the scarcity of liquidity. Here we also investigate the existence of ine¢ cient sunspot equilibria. Finally, in Section 6, we show that e¢ ciency can be restored by introducing new markets or using tax-transfer schemes. Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Environment
Time is divided into three dates, indexed by t = 0; 1; 2. At each date, there is a single good that can be used for consumption or investment. Investment and …nancing decisions are made at the …rst date (t = 0); consumption and production occur at the second and third dates (t = 1; 2).
There is a large number of identical consumers (strictly speaking, a non-atomic continuum with unit measure), each of whom has an endowment e = (1; 0; 0) consisting of one unit of the good at date 0 and nothing at dates 1 and 2. The utility of the representative consumer is denoted by u (c 1 ; c 2 ) and de…ned by
for any consumption stream (c 1 ; c 2 ) 0. The period utility functions u 1 ( ) and u 2 ( ) have the usual properties: they are continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, and concave.
The good can be invested in risky projects at date 0 to produce outputs of the good at dates 1 and 2. The only uncertainty concerns the timing of production. Each project requires one unit of the good at date 0 and produces output at one and only one of the future dates t = 1; 2. With probability > 0 the output appears at date 1 and with probability 1 > 0 it appears at date 2. The probability is constant and the same for all projects. Since there is a large number of independent projects, we assume that the "law of large numbers"is satis…ed, meaning that the fraction of projects producing at date 1 is precisely . A project is described by an ordered pair a (a 1 ; a 2 ), where a 1 is the amount of the good produced at date 1 and a 2 is the amount produced at date 2. The set of available projects is de…ned by a smooth production possibility frontier a 2 = ' (a 1 ), that is, the project a = (a 1 ; a 2 ) is feasible if and only if 0 a 1 1 and 0 a 2 '(a 1 );
where '( ) satis…es the usual properties: it is continuously di¤erentiable, decreasing and strictly concave on (0; 1), satis…es the boundary condition ' (1) = 0 and the Inada conditions
0 (a 1 ) = 0 and lim
Projects are operated by …rms owned by entrepreneurs 3 . More speci…cally, there is assumed to be a large number of risk neutral entrepreneurs, each of whom can undertake a single project requiring the investment of one unit of the good at date 0. Entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and consumers cannot undertake investment projects themselves, so projects are undertaken by …rms and …nanced by consumers. The number of entrepreneurs is assumed to be greater than the number of consumers, so the number of entrepreneurs willing to undertake a project is greater than the number of projects that can be …nanced by consumers. This "free entry"assumption ensures that …rms earn zero pro…ts in equilibrium.
Given that entrepreneurs earn zero pro…ts in equilibrium, in characterizing Pareto-e¢ cient allocations we restrict our attention to allocations where all the projects'output goes to the consumers. At a symmetric, Pareto-e¢ cient allocation all endowments are invested at date 0 in feasible projects whose output maximizes the expected utility of the representative consumer. In addition, since ' is strictly concave, Pareto e¢ ciency requires that all endowments be invested in a unique type of project.
Suppose that a project a is chosen at date 0. At each date t = 1; 2, consumption equals total output. Total output at date 1 is equal to a 1 since a fraction of the projects produce a 1 at date 1; similarly, consumption at date 2 is equal to (1 ) a 2 since a fraction 1 of projects produce a 2 at date 2. Thus, the representative consumer consumes a 1 at date 1 and (1 ) a 2 at date 2. We say that a project a supports a symmetric, Pareto-e¢ cient allocation if it maximizes
among the set of feasible projects. The Inada conditions imply that the e¢ cient project must have positive output at each date t = 1; 2; that is, 0 < a 1 < 1. Thus, a is Pareto-e¢ cient if and only if it satis…es the …rst-order condition for an interior maximum, 3 In what follows, we use the terms …rm and entrepreneur interchangeably.
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The e¢ cient allocation is illustrated in Figure 1 .
- Figure 1 here -
Equilibrium

Overview
We make the extreme assumption that short-term debt is the only …nancial instrument available in the economy. A bond issued at date 0 is a promise to pay one unit of the good at the beginning of date 1. Entrepreneurs issue bonds, collateralized by future output, to …nance their investment in risky projects. They make their production and …nancing decisions to maximize their …rm's pro…ts. Consumers purchase bonds issued by entrepreneurs to …nance their future consumption. They choose the type of bonds that maximizes their expected utility, given the entrepreneurs'choice of project and the market price of the bonds. Since projects are risky and the promised return on debt is non-contingent, entrepreneurs may not have enough resources to ful…l their debt obligations at date 1. In that event they may have to default. The institution of bankruptcy requires the resolution of the defaulted debt by means of an immediate payment to creditors in cash and not in the form of claims to future payments. The entrepreneurs whose projects produce output at date 1 (early producers) can make an immediate payment. The others (late producers) have no income readily available. They can avoid default by renegotiating the debt with their creditors and rolling it over to the next period. If they fail to renegotiate the debt, however, they must declare bankruptcy and liquidate the …rm's assets (i.e., its claims on future roduction) by selling them in the asset market. The proceeds of this sale are used to repay creditors.
To clarify the timing of these events and their consequences, we divide the second date into three sub-periods, labelled A, B, and C, corresponding to the three phases of the bankruptcy process, repayment/renegotiation/default, liquidation and resolution, respectively. In subperiod A, each entrepreneur discovers whether he is an early or late producer. If he is an early producer, he immediately pays his creditors. If he is a late producer, he either renegotiates the debt (i.e., rolls it over) or defaults. Late producers who fail to renegotiate their debt sell the …rms' assets in the market that opens in sub-period B. The liquidated value of these …rms is paid to the creditors, up to the nominal value of their debt, in sub-period C. This time line is illustrated in Figure 2 .
- Figure 2 hereThe process of renegotiation and bankruptcy in ‡uences the actual payo¤ to bondholders and hence the value of the debt associated with di¤erent types of projects. In particular, it implies that the value of the debt at date 0 will depend on the value at date 1 of claims to date-2 output. The entrepreneurs'choice of project and the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocation may also be a¤ected.
At date 1, consumers have to decide whether to use any of the income they receive from early producers to purchase the assets of the liquidated …rms in sub-period B and, in so doing, transfer this income to the …nal period. At date 2, the bonds issued at date 1 pay o¤ and there is no further trade.
Markets are competitive and prices set at a level such that markets clear in equilibrium. In particular, at date 0, the supply of bonds issued by entrepreneurs equals the demand by consumers. Similarly at date 1 the supply of bonds by defaulting entrepreneurs is equal to the consumers'demand.
In the remainder of this section we provide a more precise statement of the equilibrium conditions at the same time as deriving some basic equilibrium properties. By the end of the section we will have derived the reduced-form set of equilibrium equations that we analyze in the sections that follow. In Section 3.2, we provide a precise account of the renegotiation game between …rms and their creditors that determines whether the debt can be paid o¤ or renegotiated and rolled over, or the …rm is forced to default. We show that the renegotiation game results in default if and only if the present value of the …rm's revenue stream is less than the face value of its debt. In Section 3.3, we summarize the creditors'payo¤s in each of the situations that can arise at date 1. Having characterized the outcome at date 1, taking as given the entrepreneurs'decisions at date 0, in Section 3.4 we proceed to analyze the entrepreneur's problem, which is to raise …nance and choose a production plan that maximizes the value of his …rm. The value of the …rm depends on the consumers'marginal valuation for consumption at each future date, on the market price of bonds at date 1, and on the possibility of default. Once the entrepreneur has made his …nancial and production decisions at date 0, his future actions are all determined. It remains to characterize the behavior of consumers, which we do in Section 3.5. At the …rst date, consumers inelastically supply their funds to the …rms that o¤er the best returns. At date 1, they make the optimal consumption and savings decision, taking the bond price and the …rms'payouts and defaults as given. The last step in our characterization of equilibrium is the statement of the marketclearing conditions, in Section 3.6.
Renegotiation and default
Consider an entrepreneur who invested 1 unit of the good at date 0, issued debt with a face value of d 0 > 0 and chose the project a = (a 1 ; a 2 ). At the beginning of date 1, the entrepreneur learns whether he is an early producer who receives output a 1 at date 1 or a late producer who receives output a 2 at date 2.
Sub-period A: repayment/renegotiation/default. Payments on debt obligations are due in this …rst sub-period. There are two cases to be analyzed, depending on whether the …rm's output appears in the present or in the future.
Early producers: An early producer receives a revenue of a 1 at the beginning of date 1. If the face value of the short-term debt is less than or equal to his revenue (d 0 a 1 ), the entrepreneur is solvent and immediately pays the amount d 0 to his creditors. On the other hand, if the face value of the debt is greater than his revenue (a 1 < d 0 ), the entrepreneur is insolvent. In this case he defaults and pays as much as he can (i.e., a 1 ) to the bond holders. Since the project's future output is zero no further payment can be made.
Thus, an early producer, whether he is solvent or not, makes a payment min fa 1 ; d 0 g to the bond holders in sub-period A.
Late producers: A late producer has no current output, but expects to receive a 2 in the next period. To avoid default, he must renegotiate or "roll over" the debt d 0 . The renegotiation procedure is structured as follows. The entrepreneur makes a "take it or leave it" o¤er to the bond holders, o¤ering to exchange new short-term debt with a face value of d 1 for the old debt d 0 issued at date 0. Once the entrepreneur has made an o¤er, the creditors simultaneously accept or reject it. The renegotiation succeeds if a majority of the creditors accept and the entrepreneur can a¤ord to pay o¤ the bond holders who reject the o¤er. Otherwise it fails and the entrepreneur is forced to default and to liquidate his …rm's assets, giving the proceeds to his creditors. All this has to be done before the end of the current period (date 1).
Sub-period B: liquidation. In this sub-period the market for the assets of defaulting late producers opens. The only asset these entrepreneurs possess is their claim to the project's future output. Since there is no uncertainty about the amount of future output, this claim can be realized by issuing riskless debt, fully collateralized by the future output. The debt trades at a uniform price q 1 regardless of the …rm's project since there is no default risk.
Sub-period C: resolution. At the end of date 1, bankrupt late producers settle their debts by distributing the liquidated value of their projects, q 1 a 2 , pro rata among their creditors.
Because of the timing of default, liquidation, and resolution, there is a marked asymmetry between early and late producers in default. If an early producer defaults in sub-period A, he immediately hands over his output a 1 in partial payment of his debt. Defaulting late producers are in a di¤erent situation. Because they have no current revenue, they must liquidate their assets in sub-period B before making any payment to their creditors. So these are forced to wait until sub-period C for payment. The delay is important because income received from liquidation in sub-period C cannot be used to purchase bonds in subperiod B. This can a¤ect the equilibrium price of bonds q 1 which in turn will a¤ect the amount, min fq 1 a 2 ; d 0 g, that the creditors eventually receive.
The renegotiation game
Now that we have described the sequence of events at date 1, we can analyze the outcome of the renegotiation process between a late producer and the bond holders who …nanced his project. Suppose that, for the entrepreneur in question, the chosen project is a = (a 1 ; a 2 ) and the face value of debt is d 0 .
The renegotiation game consists of two stages:
The entrepreneur makes a "take it or leave it"o¤er d 1 a 2 to the bond holders.
The bond holders simultaneously accept or reject the …rm's o¤er.
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Two conditions must be satis…ed in order for the renegotiation to succeed.
(i) First, a majority of the bond holders must accept the o¤er.
(ii) Secondly, the rest of the bond holders must be paid o¤ in full. Hence, if a fraction > 0:5 of bond holders accept they must be paid d 1 at date 2, while the remaining fraction 1 must be paid d 0 at date 1 in sub-period A. This is feasible if the budget constraint
If either condition is not satis…ed, the renegotiation fails and the entrepreneur is forced to default, liquidate the project, and distribute the proceeds to the bond holders at the end of the period. If a bond holder accepts the o¤er and renegotiation succeeds, he receives d 1 at date 2. If he rejects the o¤er and renegotiation still succeeds, he must be paid d 0 immediately, i.e., in sub-period A. If renegotiation fails, the bond holder receives min fq 1 a 2 ; d 0 g at the end of date 1, regardless of whether he accepts or rejects. Let (c 1 ; c 2 ) be the consumption pro…le of the representative consumer. In equilibrium each consumer holds a negligible amount of the debt issued by any …rm, to fully diversify …rm speci…c risk, so his payo¤s for accepting and rejecting the renegotiation o¤er are described in the following table:
If the consumer rejects a successful o¤er, he can choose to consume his payment d 0 at date 1 or he can invest it in bonds and consume d 0 =q 1 at date 2. Thus, his payo¤ is the maximum of u
This gives us the entry in the lower left hand cell. The others are self-explanatory.
The subgame given by the second stage of the renegotiation game has some of the features of a coordination game, so it is not surprising that there may be multiple equilibria. In particular, if a majority of bond holders rejects the entrepreneur's o¤er, renegotiation fails and the individual bond holder receives the same payo¤ whether he accepts or rejects the o¤er. Thus, there is always an equilibrium of the subgame in which all bond holders reject the o¤er, renegotiation fails, and the project is liquidated prematurely.
There is also a pure-strategy equilibrium of this subgame in which renegotiation succeeds if and only if
that is, the payo¤ from accepting the entrepreneur's o¤er, conditional on success, is at least as great as the payo¤ from rejecting it. In what follows, we will consider the case where renegotiation fails only if it is unavoidable. That is, bond holders are assumed to accept the o¤er if acceptance is optimal when everyone else accepts. This minimizes the incidence of default and restricts default to those cases where it is essential (Allen and Gale, 1998).
denote the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, condition (2) can be equivalently written as:
In analyzing the renegotiation game, it is convenient to anticipate a property of the equilibria of the economy that we establish later. For the moment, we treat this property as an auxiliary assumption:
Condition (3) implies that, in equilibrium, consumers might want to purchase more riskless debt at date 1 than they are able to. With this temporary assumption we can prove the following result.
there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game in which the entrepreneur o¤ers
there is no equilibrium in which renegotiation succeeds: in every subgame perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game the entrepreneur is forced to default and liquidate the project. 
Payments to bond holders
In the preceding analysis we have seen that a bond issued at date 0 yields di¤erent payments, depending on whether the entrepreneur turns out to be an early or late producer and whether early or late producers default. These payments are displayed in the table below. A bond issued at date 0 is identi…ed by its face value d 0 and the project a it …nances. The bond market at date 0 is competitive. For any feasible project a, let V (a; d 0 ) denote the market value of debt with face value d 0 issued to …nance project a. Given the presence of a representative consumer, in equilibrium V (a; d 0 ) equals the ratio of the consumer's marginal utility of the payo¤ from a unit investment in a bond of type (a; d 0 ) to his marginal utility of income at date 0.
Production and …nancing decisions
Now we can describe the entrepreneur's production and …nancing decisions. Taking the price function V ( ) as given, the entrepreneur's decision problem consists of choosing an admissible project a and face value of the debt d 0 to maximize his …rm's pro…ts 4 :
Equivalently, we can interpret this problem as maximizing the value of the debt issued. Since entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and there is limited liability, the …rm's revenue can never be negative. The speci…cation of the objective function in (4) re ‡ects the fact that, if the value of the debt issued is lower than the cost of the initial investment, that is, V (a; d 0 ) < 1, it will be impossible for the entrepreneur to undertake a project at all and he will be forced to remain inactive. As we argued in Section 2, free entry by entrepreneurs ensures that …rms earn zero pro…ts in equilibrium. This fact is helpful in studying the solutions to the entrepreneurs'problem (4). The zero-pro…t condition implies that, for all (a; d 0 ),
and, for all projects whose initial investment can be …nanced, that is, ordered pairs (a; d 0 ) satisfying V (a; d 0 ) = 1, the face value of the debt d 0 must satisfy
Condition (6) says that the entrepreneur has no revenue left after paying bond holders, whether he is an early producer or a late producer. When he is an early producer, d 0 a 1 implies that the face value of the debt is at least as great as his …rm's revenue. When he is a late producer, d 0 q 1 a 2 ensures that either he defaults and pays out min fd 0 ; q 1 a 2 g = q 1 a 2 at (the end of) date 1 or (when d 0 = q 1 a 2 ) he renegotiates the debt and pays out d 0 =q 1 = a 2 at date 2. In either case, his …rm realizes zero pro…t. We show, in addition, that
Lemma 1 The value of the …rm's debt, and hence its pro…ts, are always maximized by setting
Proof. We show that, if d 0 > max fa 1 ; q 1 a 2 g, a reduction in d 0 has either has no e¤ect or increases V (a; q 0 ). We consider two cases in turn. If
the payments to bond holders, and hence the bond's value, are the same whether d 0 = a 1 or d 0 > a 1 , because default by early producers makes no di¤erence to the outcome and late producers must default in any case. If
late producers do not default if d 0 = q 1 a 2 whereas they must default if d 0 > q 1 a 2 . Hence, the payment to bond holders is a 2 at date 2 in the …rst case and q 1 a 2 at (the end of) date 1 in the second. Under (3), u
, and the inequality is strict if q 1 < M (c).
Thus, the value of the debt is at least as high in the case where d 0 = q 1 a 2 as it is in the case where d 0 > q 1 a 2 and is strictly higher if q 1 < M (c).
In the sequel we restrict our attention to the case where, for any project the entrepreneur considers undertaking in equilibrium, the face value of the debt issued satis…es (7) . On this basis, the speci…cation of the payo¤s for bondholders obtained in Section 3.3 can be further simpli…ed:
(i) if a 1 q 1 a 2 , we have:
-early producers default and pay a 1 at date 1 -late producers are solvent and pay a 2 at date 2.
(ii) if a 1 > q 1 a 2 :
-early producers are solvent and pay a 1 at date 1 -late producers default and pay q 1 a 2 at (the end of) date 1
Note that the possibility of default introduces a discontinuity in payo¤s and hence a nonconvexity into the entrepreneur's decision problem. For this reason, we divide the analysis of the entrepreneur's decision into two parts, depending on whether the late producer is solvent or in default. Each case corresponds to a convex sub-problem.
(i) Late producers solvent Consider …rst projects such that q 1 a 2 a 1 . In this case, as we argued above, creditors receive a 1 at date 1 with probability and a 2 at date 2 with probability 1
. They can use the payment received at date 1 for immediate consumption or to purchase bonds for future consumption, whichever gives them the greater utility. Because of our auxiliary assumption, q 1 M (c), it is always weakly optimal at the margin to save the payment until date 2. Hence, the market value of the debt issued to …nance these projects, with face value
where > 0 denotes the marginal utility of consumption at date 0.
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(ii) Late producers in default For projects such that q 1 a 2 < a 1 , the entrepreneur defaults when he is a late producer. Bond holders again receive a 1 at date 1 with probability , but now they get a payment q 1 a 2 at the end of date 1 with probability 1 . In the …rst event, we can again suppose without loss of generality that the payment received at date 1 is saved until date 2. Then the market value of the debt issued at date
We can formalize the properties of the entrepreneurs'decision in the following claim.
Claim 1 In a competitive equilibrium where (some) entrepreneurs are active, each entrepreneur chooses an admissible project a which solves his decision problem (4), where V (a; d 0 ) is given by (8) for projects such that q 1 a 2 a 1 and by (9) for projects such that q 1 a 2 < a 1 . In addition, V ( a; max f a 1 ; q 1 a 2 g) = 1 and V (a; max fa 1 ; q 1 a 2 g) 1
for any other feasible project a.
Given the non-convexity of the …rms' choice problem, it is possible that an array of projects is chosen in equilibrium. To keep the notation simple, however, we stated both the above claim and the following characterization of equilibrium for the symmetric case in which all entrepreneurs choose the same project a. 
The consumer' s decision
At date 0, consumers supply their endowments in exchange for bonds. The price function V ( ) speci…ed in (8) and (9) ensures that, provided c is the representative consumer's optimal consumption plan and his marginal utility of income at date 0, he is willing to …nance any project a the entrepreneurs may choose. More precisely, for any (a; d 0 ), consumers are willing to purchase bonds with value V (a; d 0 ) at date 0 from any entrepreneur who chooses a project a and issues bonds with face value d 0 .
The consumer's problem at date 2 is trivial, because there is no further trade and the consumer simply consumes all his income. It remains to analyze his choice problem at date 1, when the consumer has to decide how much of his current income to use for immediate consumption and how much to save in the form of short-term debt. In particular, we need to verify that condition (3), which we have used as an auxiliary assumption, actually holds in equilibrium.
The consumer's decision problem at date 1 di¤ers according to whether late producers are solvent or in default. As in the previous section, we consider each case in turn.
(i) Late producers solvent: d 0 = q 1 a 2 a 1 In this case, as we saw, the early producers pay out a 1 in sub-period A of date 1, and the late producers roll over their debt and pay out a 2 at date 2. Each consumer receives a deterministic payment 7 
It is clear that in this case the liquidity constraint, q 1 b 1 a 1 , requiring that the expenditure on bonds does not exceed the consumer's available income, is implied by the date-1 budget constraint, c 1 = a 1 q 1 b 1 , and the condition c 1 0. Then the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for (c 1 ; c 2 ) and b 1 to be a solution of the consumer's decision problem are the two budget constraints, i.e., the second and third constraints in (10) , and the …rst-order condition
(ii) Late producers in default: d 0 = a 1 > q 1 a 2 The only di¤erence for the consumer with respect to the previous case is that he now receives no payment at date 2, but instead receives an amount (1 ) q 1 a 2 in sub-period C of date 1. Hence the income available to buy bonds when the bond market opens is still equal to a 1 while the income which can be used for consumption is now a 1 + (1 ) q 1 a 2 q 1 b 1 at date 1 and b 1 at date 2. Hence, the consumer's problem at date 1 is to choose a consumption plan c and bond holding b 1 to solve
In this case, the liquidity constraint is no longer redundant. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for (c 1 ; c 2 ) and b 1 to be an optimum are the three constraints in (12) and the …rst-order condition
where the inequality (13) is strict only when the liquidity constraint is binding, i.e., q 1 b 1 = a 1 . When q 1 < M (c), the consumer would like to save more, but is unable to use the payment q 1 (1 ) a 2 he anticipates receiving in sub-period C as collateral in order to borrow the cash needed in sub-period B to purchase additional short-term debt.
Note that the …rst-order conditions (11) and (13) imply that our earlier auxiliary assumption (3) will indeed be satis…ed in equilibrium.
Market clearing
Now we are ready to put together the di¤erent elements of the model to de…ne an equilibrium. An equilibrium consists of a project a chosen by entrepreneurs, a consumption plan c chosen by consumers (with the implied value of the marginal utility of date-0 income), and prices V ( ) and q 1 for the bonds issued, respectively, at dates 0 and 1 such that markets clear.
Market clearing at date 0 requires the entrepreneurs'supply of bonds to equal consumers' demand. As anticipated in the previous section, the speci…cation of the bond-price function V ( ) in (8) and (9), with q 1 ; c;
as above, together with Claim 1, ensure market clearing holds if V ( a; max f a 1 ; q 1 a 2 g) = 1:
The market value of the debt issued allows entrepreneurs to raise just enough funds to …nance the projects they have chosen.
Since markets do not re-open at date 2, the only other market-clearing condition concerns the bond market at date 1. The speci…cation of the market-clearing condition again depends on whether late producers are solvent or in default when they choose project a and the bond price is q 1 .
If late producers are solvent, they will roll over their debt, o¤ering short-term debt with a face value of d 1 = a 2 to the bond holders. So, when the bond market opens in sub-period B, they have no need to issue new debt and there is no supply of bonds in the market. In equilibrium, the bond price must be such that the consumers'demand for bonds equals zero. In other words, ( c 1 ; c 2 ) = ( a 1 ; (1 ) a 2 ) and b 1 = 0:
must be a solution of problem (10) . This is the case if and only if q 1 = M ( c), so that the consumers'…rst-order condition (11) is satis…ed. The more interesting case is the one in which late producers are forced to default, package their claims to future output as collateralized debt, and supply bonds with face value d 1 = a 2 when the market opens in sub-period B. In equilibrium, consumers must now demand a positive amount of bonds, that is,
must solve (12) . This happens if the consumers'…rst-order condition (13) holds. The …rst-order condition takes two possible forms, according to whether the liquidity constraint q 1 b 1 a 1 holds as an equality or as an inequality. In the …rst case, the liquidity constraint is binding and we have q 1 b 1 = a 1 and q 1 M ( c); in the second case, we have q 1 = M ( c) and q 1 b 1 < a 1 . These two conditions are equivalent to:
We can now state the de…nition of a symmetric competitive equilibrium (with nonzero output), that is, an equilibrium in which (some) entrepreneurs are active and choose the same value of (a; d 0 ). De…nition 1 A (symmetric) competitive equilibrium consists of a project a, a corresponding consumption stream ( c 1 ; c 2 ) = ( a 1 ; (1 ) a 2 ) and a date-1 price of the bond q 1 such that (a) a solves the entrepreneur's problem (4) when V ( ) is given by (8) and (9); (b) the bond market clears at date 0,
and (c) the bond market clears at date 1,
Given the non-convexities in the entrepreneur's decision problem, a symmetric equilibrium may not always exist. So we can only prove the existence of an equilibrium in general if we allow for the possibility that an array of projects is chosen. In that case, we say the equilibrium is mixed.
Proposition 2 Under the stated assumptions on consumers'preferences and the technology, a (possibly mixed) competitive equilibrium always exists.
When are equilibria e¢ cient?
Now that we have derived a reduced form characterization of equilibrium, we are ready to analyze its e¢ ciency. In this section we determine the conditions under which the unique (symmetric) e¢ cient allocation can be supported as an equilibrium. We will …nd that this happens under two quite di¤erent circumstances. The …rst one is when an equilibrium exists where early producers default and late producers roll over their debt to the third and …nal 8 This can be seen by noticing that the …rst condition can be restated as
and the second one as
period. In such equilibrium, there is no trade in the asset markets in the middle period and the equilibrium supply of liquidity is then irrelevant. The second one is when we have an equilibrium where early producers are solvent and late producers default, but the supply of liquidity is su¢ ciently high that assets trade at their fundamental value. These two cases exhaust the possibilities for supporting an e¢ cient allocation as a competitive equilibrium. In the remainder of this section, we use the reduced-form characterization of equilibrium in De…nition 1 to identify the parameter values for which these cases obtain. From De…nition 1, we can partition the set of symmetric competitive equilibria according to whether q 1 = M ( c) or q 1 < M ( c). In an equilibrium where q 1 = a 1 (1 ) a 2 < M ( c), late producers default ( q 1 a 2 < a 1 ) and the condition for an (interior) solution of the entrepreneur's problem is:
Condition (17) is di¤erent from the e¢ ciency condition (1) and, in fact, we will show that the equilibrium is always ine¢ cient in this case. In all other equilibria we have q 1 = M ( c) and an (interior) solution of the …rm's problem a satis…es
In other words, the consumers'MRS equals the project's MRT, the same as in the e¢ ciency condition (1). Thus, a symmetric competitive equilibrium is Pareto-e¢ cient if and only if q 1 = M ( c).
As shown in Section 2, the economy we have described admits a unique, symmetric, Pareto-e¢ cient allocation, supported by the project a that satis…es equation (1) and a 2 = ' (a 1 ). The next result identi…es conditions on preferences and technology under which a Pareto-e¢ cient competitive equilibrium exists.
Proposition 3 Let a be a feasible project supporting an e¢ cient allocation. This allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium if and only if either (i)
Whenever (i) or (ii) holds, we show that an e¢ cient equilibrium exists where q 1 = M (c ), 9 and late producers are solvent (in case (i)) or default (in case (ii)). When
solves the …rm's choice problem if it satis…es (18), which coincides with (1). On the other hand, when neither (i) nor (ii) hold, that is, when
an equilibrium supporting a , if it exists, must satisfy q 1 < M (c ). As we have seen above, in such an equilibrium, a is a solution of the entrepreneur's problem only if it satis…es (17), which we will show is impossible. Hence we conclude that no Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium exists in that case. Note that (19) can only hold if < 1=2.
Proof. Set
In case (i) we have q 1 a 2 = M (c )a 2 a 1 ; so if entrepreneurs choose a late producers are solvent and the bond market clears with zero trade. In case (ii) M (c )a 2 < a 1 , so if a is chosen, late producers default and the bond market again clears, since
To conclude that there is a competitive equilibrium in which project a is chosen, it is only left to prove that a solves the entrepreneurs'choice problem at q 1 . Note that at q 1 = M (c ); both for a such that q 1 a 2 < a 1 (late producers default) and for a such that q 1 a 2 a 1 (early producers default), we have
The condition for a maximum of this expression is the same as the …rst-order condition for e¢ ciency, given by (1) and clearly satis…ed by a . Hence, a always maximizes the …rm's pro…ts at q 1 = M (c ) and (a ; q 1 ) is an equilibrium. Next we show that the e¢ cient allocation cannot be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium when neither (i) nor (ii) holds, that is under (19). The proof is by contradiction. Suppose (a ; q 1 ) is an equilibrium. Then market-clearing requires
In addition, a must be the entrepreneurs'optimal choice at q 1 =
. Since a 1 > q 1 a 2 , late producers default at a and a must then be an interior local maximum of problem (4) when V ( ) is given by (9) , that is, (17) must hold. From (17), under (19) we get
Using the …rst-order condition for e¢ ciency, (1), which must hold at a , this inequality can be rewritten as a 2 a 1
(1 )M (c ) < 1; a contradiction to (19). This completes the proof of the theorem.
Scarce liquidity and ine¢ ciency
Proposition 3 identi…es the parameter values for which it is possible to decentralize the e¢ cient allocation. Since a competitive equilibrium always exists, by Proposition 2, it follows that an ine¢ cient equilibrium exists whenever the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of Proposition 3 are not satis…ed. That is, when the parameters of the economy are such that (19) holds, an ine¢ cient equilibrium must exist. What can we say about its properties? In this section we explore a special case of the economy to get a better insight into the features of an ine¢ cient equilibrium and, in particular, the form that the distortion of investment decisions takes. But …rst we state a general property of ine¢ cient equilibria. As we saw in the proof of Proposition 3, when q 1 = M ( c), the expressions for V ( ) in (8) and in (9) coincide and the solution of the entrepreneurs'problem (4) is always given by an e¢ cient project. Hence, Claim 2 At any ine¢ cient equilibrium, q 1 < M ( c) and at least a positive fraction of entrepreneurs chooses a production plan in which late producers default.
In the rest of this section, we restrict attention to economies where consumers have a linear utility function:
The marginal rate of substitution M (c) is then constant and equal to the subjective discount factor > 0. As shown in the lemma below, the conditions under which e¢ cient allocations can be decentralized reduce in this case to conditions on . Equilibria can then be conveniently classi…ed according to the value of . Notice …rst that the …rst-order condition for e¢ ciency, (1), simpli…es to
and has a unique solution a 1 ( ), where a 1 ( ) is a continuous function of . It can immediately be veri…ed that a 1 ( ) is monotonically decreasing in and that a 1 ! 0 as ! 1 and a 1 ! 1 as ! 0. Then a 1 ( )=' (a 1 ( )) is also monotonically decreasing in and tends to 1 as tends to 0. The following lemma is the analogue of Proposition 3 for preferences satisfying (20).
Lemma 2 Suppose consumers' preferences are given by the utility function in (20). Then there exist positive numbers and such that:
; and, in this case, there is an e¢ cient equilibrium where q 1 = and late producers are solvent; (ii) ()
; and, in this case, for all min f ; g there is an e¢ cient equilibrium in which q 1 = and late producers default; (iii) < () < 1=2:
By Proposition 3 it also follows that for any in the region ( ; ) -non-empty if < 1=2 -any equilibrium is ine¢ cient. Given our interest in ine¢ cient equilibria, we will focus here on values of < . To characterize the properties of equilibria in this region, we investigate …rst how the entrepreneurs'optimal project varies with q 1 , for q 1 . In the proof of the next proposition, we show that, if the optimal project is such that late producers default, it is an interior maximum of (9), while if it is such that late producers are solvent it is a corner solution (i.e., the solution occurs at the valueâ 1 such thatâ 1 = q 1 ' (â 1 )). We can then compare the maximal value of (9) and of (8) to determine which one solves the entrepreneurs'choice problem (4) for each q 1 and, …nally, verify at which prices the bond market-clearing condition is satis…ed. In the next result we impose an additional property on the technology ' requiring that it be symmetric, that is: (20), ' is symmetric and
Proposition 4 Suppose the consumers' utility function is as in
> , all equilibria are ine¢ cient and the equilibrium set is described by one of the following three cases : (a) there is a unique, symmetric equilibrium in which late producers default; (b) there is a unique mixed equilibrium in which entrepreneurs choose between two production plans, at one of which late producers are solvent and at the other late producers default; (c) there are three equilibria, one symmetric equilibrium as in a) and two mixed equilibria as in b). On the other hand, if [ii] < a unique, e¢ cient equilibrium exists.
In all the ine¢ cient symmetric equilibria characterized in the above proposition, the project chosen in equilibrium is such that a 1 > a 1 ( ), thus the distortion takes the form of a project with a higher payo¤ at date 1 than the e¢ cient project a . This can be viewed as a response to the shortage of liquidity at q 1 = (as we see from (19), the supply of liquidity by consumers, equal to a 1 = , is strictly lower than …rms'demand, (1 )a 2 ); this drives down q 1 and induces entrepreneurs to choose more liquid projects, that is projects with higher payo¤s at date 1 to pro…t from the higher rate of return available at that date. In mixed equilibria we still have q 1 < ; and a positive fraction of entrepreneurs choosing a project such that a 0 1 > a 1 ( ), but the rest of them choose a project a 00 1 < a 1 ( ) where late producers are solvent, which reduces the demand for liquidity at date 1. Notice that when multiple equilibria exist, as in case (i.c), they are always Pareto-ranked.
How do the properties of the equilibria vary with in the ine¢ cient region ( ; )? If increases, at the e¢ cient project a 1 decreases while, as shown in the proof of the proposition above, at a symmetric equilibrium a 1 increases; hence the ine¢ ciency gap increases. Sunspot Equilibria. We show next that an additional type of ine¢ cient equilibria, where the date-1 bond price ‡uctuates randomly in response to the realization of a sunspot event, might also exist. The argument is constructive and general. However, both to illustrate it more simply and to allow a closer comparison with the properties of the equilibria characterized in the …rst part of this section, the argument will be presented for the case where the consumers'utility function is linear, as in (20).
Proposition 5
with probabilities 1 " and " respectively.
Proof. We will show that, for " su¢ ciently small, the entrepreneurs' optimal choice is obtained as a solution of the following programme 10 :
subject to the constraints a 1 a 2 and a 1 > e e q 1 a 2 . That is, the entrepreneurs' optimal choice is given by a project such that late producers are solvent when the date 1 bond price is e q 1 = and default when it is e e q 1 . Note that the maximum of a 1 + (1 ) ' (a 1 ) is attained at the e¢ cient project a . By Lemma 2, > implies that > a 1 =a 2 , while < 1=2 implies that a 1 =a 2 > a 1 =[(1 ) a 2 ] so that a satis…es the constraints of problem (23) (when e e q 1 is set equal to
and is a solution of such problem when " = 0. Since, again by Lemma 2, < 1=2 implies < and hence for > we also have > a 1 =[(1 ) a 2 ], the bonds market clearing condition (c) of De…nition 1 is satis…ed both when the price q 1 is equal to and when it equals a 1 =[(1 ) a 2 . By continuity, when " is su¢ ciently small the solution a of problem (23) above (at the corresponding value of e e q 1 given by (22)) will be close to a and the same properties hold.
To be able to say that a is also a solution of the entrepreneur's problem (4) it remains to be shown that the entrepreneur's pro…ts are also higher at a than at any other project such that late producers default both when q 1 equals and when it equals e e q 1 , that is, at the maximum of
subject to a 1 > a 2 , 11 as well as at any project such that late producers never default, i.e. at the maximum of
subject to the constraint a 1 e e q 1 a 2 . 12 For " su¢ ciently small, (24) will be maximized at a such that a 1 = a 2 and (25) at a such that a 1 = e e q 1 a 2 , and the …rm's pro…ts will clearly be less than at a.
Combining the result in this proposition with the one in Lemma 2, when > and < 1=2 at least two competitive equilibria exist, an e¢ cient one where q 1 = and an ine¢ cient sunspot equilibrium where the bond price takes the values and e e q 1 < , with probabilities 1 " and ". In the latter, the self-ful…lling belief that the bond price will collapse with positive probability at date 1 induces late producers to default when that happens. The anticipation of this event leads entrepreneurs to choose a project with an ine¢ ciently high level of output at date 1, a 1 > a 1 , to pro…t from the low bond price at that date. For " small, the distortion in the investment decision will also be relatively small, but the collapse in the bond price, when it occurs, will be quite signi…cant.
Restoring e¢ ciency
We have focused on the existence and characterization of ine¢ cient equilibria because of the insights they o¤er into the role of liquidity in market failures. To understand why the market fails to allocate resources e¢ ciently and how the market failure might be alleviated or avoided altogether, it is helpful to ask what changes in our set-up would ensure that competitive equilibria are always e¢ cient. In this section, we consider three remedies that illustrate the role of new markets and of government intervention in achieving an e¢ cient allocation of resources.
The decentralization of the e¢ cient allocation is problematic only when late producers default and in particular when condition (19) holds, so we focus exclusively on this case in what follows. Letting a be, as before, a project supporting a Pareto e¢ cient allocation, this condition says that at the e¢ cient asset price M (c ), late producers default
and there is insu¢ cient liquidity for the asset market to clear
There are several ways to support the decentralization of the e¢ cient allocation under these circumstances. We begin by considering the e¤ect of introducing (…rm-speci…c) contingent claims.
Completing the market.
Markets are incomplete at date 0 because it is impossible to make trades contingent on the state of an individual …rm at date 1. Suppose we introduce …rm-speci…c securities that pay one unit of the good at date 1 if the entrepreneur turns out to be an early (resp. late) producer and nothing otherwise. These securities are traded at date 0 and their prices are denoted by q 01 and q 02 , respectively. Now each entrepreneur is able to purchase insurance against being an early or late producer and to avoid default if he wishes. With these additional markets, we can show that there exists a competitive equilibrium in which entrepreneurs choose the project a and the market-clearing price is q 1 = M (c ).
Let b 01 (respectively, b 02 ) denote the demand for securities that pay out if the entrepreneur is an early (respectively, late) producer. For any project a and any face value d 0 of the debt issued at date 0 to …nance it, an appropriate portfolio (b 01 ; b 02 ) can be found to ensure that the entrepreneur's total revenue in period 1 is equal to d 0 :
In other words, default never occurs. The …rm's debt is riskless in this case and pays one unit for sure. Let q 0 be its unit price in period 0. Since all …rm speci…c risk can be fully diversi…ed, the prices for the contingent claims are fair:
The …rm's revenue at date 0 is now given by
We can then substitute from (27) for the prices of the contingent claims in the above expression and use (26) to rewrite d 0 and b 01 in terms of b 02 when a portfolio of contingent claims is acquired o¤ering full insurance against ‡uctuations in revenue. From this substitution we get the following expression:
It is clear that the project which maximizes the above expression, and hence constitutes the value maximizing choice of the …rm 13 , is the e¢ cient one, a . Note also that the optimal level of b 02 is indeterminate because the usual ModiglianiMiller argument implies that the …rm's capital structure is indeterminate. Any portfolio that is, the market for contingent claims clears (with zero trades by consumers). We conclude that the project a and the bond price q 1 = M (c ) together constitute a competitive equilibrium.
A similar argument su¢ ces to show that default cannot occur in equilibrium. For example, consider the ine¢ cient equilibrium found in the previous sections in which early producers default. In the presence of markets for contingent claims, entrepreneurs could achieve a higher value of the debt issued at date 0 by choosing a portfolio (b 01 ; b 02 ) that avoids the possibility of default and adjusting the face value of the debt d 0 accordingly.
Asset purchases with IOU' s
The introduction of contingent claims allows entrepreneurs to fully insure against the variability in their …rms'future cash ‡ow and hence removes the need for default in equilibrium. An alternative way to attain e¢ ciency is to remove the "cash in advance constraint"that restricts asset purchases in period 1 and generates distortions in the asset price in that period. In this case, default still occurs at date 1, but does not distort the entrepreneur's decisions at date 0.
Suppose, for example, that consumers are allowed to purchase assets using IOU's backed by their claims on defaulting …rms. In that case the total amount of "cash" available to consumers in the bond market in sub-period B is equal to the revenue received from early producers, a 1 , plus the value of the liquidated assets received from defaulting …rms in sub-period C, q 1 (1 ) a 2 . The market-clearing condition now becomes
with q 1 = M (c) if the inequality is strict. Of course, the inequality must be strict since a 1 > 0, so the equilibrium asset price will be at the e¢ cient level q 1 = M (c) and entrepreneurs will make e¢ cient decisions. Since the value of the liquidated assets is returned to creditors in sub-period C, the amount of "cash" available to buy assets will always be greater than the purchase price, which implies that the cash in advance constraint is never binding.
Government intervention
Another way of preventing market failure is to use Pigovian taxes to o¤set the distortion caused by the liquidity-constrained level of the asset price. The distortion, as we saw, consists in the adoption of projects with an ine¢ ciently high payo¤ at date 1. Suppose the government adopts a tax policy that imposes a tax on returns from early producers and a subsidy on returns from late producers. Let 1 denote the tax on the income accruing to bondholders from early producers and 2 the tax on the income they receive from late producers. We will show that = ( 1 ; 2 ) can be chosen so that the e¢ cient project a is chosen in equilibrium.
All tax payments are collected (or paid out, in the case of negative taxes) in the initial sub-period A at the beginning of date 1. The policy is designed to raise zero revenue,
where q 1 is the market-clearing price. Because the tax imposed on the revenue consumers obtain from early producers is equal to the subsidy on the revenue consumers get from late producers, and both the tax and the subsidy 14 are paid and received at the beginning of date 1, the total liquidity in the market remains equal to a 1 . In equilibrium we still have late producers defaulting so that the market-clearing price q 1 is again given by
Substituting from this condition into the budget balance equation (28), we see that
which implies that 1 = 2 = , say. The entrepreneur's problem then is to choose a 1 to maximize the value of the debt, now proportional to
This expression takes into account the taxes bondholders must pay (or receive) on their revenue as well as the fact that the subsidy (negative tax) on the returns from the late producers is paid at the beginning of date 1, before the asset market opens, and hence can be invested in bonds and consumed at date 2. This is optimal because q 1 < q 1 . With this formulation of the problem, the …rst-order condition for value maximization is
Evaluating the above expression at a and using the …rst-order condition for e¢ ciency, (1) yields:
which is satis…ed if
The tax scheme described above is e¤ective in deterring entrepreneurs from exploiting the arbitrage opportunity provided by the fact that defaulting …rms sell at a low value. As a consequence, liquidity remains scarce but entrepreneurs'investment decisions are not distorted.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we extend the de…nition of a competitive equilibrium given in De…nition 1 to the case of a mixed equilibrium. In that case, a fraction D of entrepreneurs choose a project a D such that late producers default, while the remaining fraction S = 1 D choose a project a S such that late producers are solvent. Consumption is then c = P i=D;S i a i 1 ;
2 , the market clearing condition (16) becomes:
and both a D and a S solve the entrepreneur's problem (4) at q 1 ; M ( c).
for some …xed but arbitrary " > 0,
For any small " > 0, a correspondence
is constructed in Steps 1-4 below. Let ( ; x) denote a generic element of M " X " and ( 0 ; x 0 ) a generic element of 1 ( ; x) 2 ( ; x).
Step 1. First, the allocation c induced by ( ; x) is given by:
Step 2. Secondly, de…ne the map yielding the equilibrium price q 1 induced by the allocation ( ; x):
Note that, since x 2 X " , both x S > 0 and x D < 1 and, hence, ' (x D ) > 0. Furthermore, since 2 M " , both S > 0 and D > 0. Then 0 < q 1 < 1 and the map de…ned by the expression on the right hand side of (A2) is continuous at all ( ; x).
Step 3. Next, the following map gives the entrepreneurs' choice which is optimal (pro…t maximizing) among all projects such that late producers are solvent (for c = c ( ; x) ; q 1 = q 1 ( ; x)):
Note that x 0 S is uniquely de…ned because of the strict concavity of ' and x 0 S is continuous in ( ; x) by the Maximum Theorem. The following map yields then the value of the objective function in (A3), evaluated at the optimum x 0 S :
In a similar way, we de…ne the optimal choice among all projects such that late producers default:
: 
denote the associated value of the objective function in (A4).
Step 4. Finally, de…ne the maps:
As established above, both x 0 S and x 0 D are continuous and hence so is 2 . The functions fV i g i=D;S , being the maximum values of the maximization problems (A4), (A3), are continuous by the Maximum Theorem. Also, the image set 1 ( ; x) is compact and convex by construction and upper hemi-continuous by the Maximum Theorem and the continuity of fV i g i=D;S . Thus 1 2 satis…es the conditions of Kakutani's theorem, so there exists a …xed point ( ; x) for every value of " > 0.
To prove the existence of an equilibrium, we use then a limiting argument as " ! 0. Consider a sequence of positive numbers f" n g such that lim n!1 " n = 0 and let f( n ; x n )g denote the corresponding sequence of …xed points. Since the sequence is bounded there exists a convergent subsequence. By an abuse of notation we use the same notation for the subsequence and write lim n!1 ( n ; x n ) = ( 0 ; x 0 ). We show next that ( 0 ; x 0 ) is an equilibrium.
Suppose that q 1 ( n ; x n ), the price corresponding to the …xed point ( n ; x n ), converges to 0 as n tends to in…nity. This requires, given the speci…cation of the map q 1 ( ) in (A2), that either lim
n ; x n )) = 0; which in turn may only hold if c 1 ( n ; x n ) ! 0, which is equivalent to, again, (A5) holding. Condition (A5) in turn implies, since
16 Hence from
and
we get lim n!1 V S ( n ; x n ) < 1 while V D ( n ; x n ) ! 1; which contradicts the previous implication that n D ! 0. Thus we conclude that lim n!1 q 1 ( n ; x n ) is bounded away from zero.
Then it is straightforward to verify that ( 0 ; x 0 ) satis…es the equilibrium conditions:
(i) the values fx 0 i g i=S;D are the entrepreneurs'optimal choices subject to the constraint that late producers are solvent, respectively default, that is solve (A3) and (A4), for " = 0, at q
(ii) the distribution 0 is concentrated on the pro…t-maximizing values among fx 0 i g i=S;D ; (iii) the asset market clears at t = 1 because (A2) is satis…ed in the limit.
Proof of Lemma 2
Given the properties of a 1 ( ) established in the text, it is clear that there must be a unique value of such that ?
16 Since x n D must be a solution of problem (A4), this is obviously true if lim n!1 u 
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A similar argument shows that there is a unique value of such that
By the de…nition of and we then readily see that < if and only if < 1=2. The rest of the claim follows by an immediate application of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
Using (20), the speci…cation given in (A4) of the program yielding the optimal production plan among those such that late producers default simpli…es to:
while the one in (A3) giving the optimal project such that late producers are solvent becomes:
Let a When q 1 = , as already argued in the proof of Proposition 3, the expressions in (A6) and (A7) are identical and equal to a 1 + (1 )' (a 1 ), whose maximum is attained at the e¢ cient project a ( ). For any < , from Lemma 2 we know that
is strictly concave in a 1 and, when we maximize this expression, the constraint a 1 ' (a 1 ) is binding, the optimal project a S ( ; ) such that late producers are solvent is attained at the value of a 1 that is the closest as possible to a 1 , i.e. is the largest possible:â 1 such that a 1 = ' (â 1 ). More generally, letâ 1 (q 1 ) denote the solution of a 1 = q 1 ' (a 1 ). The following lemma extends the argument to prices q 1 < :
; and a D 1 (q 1 ; ) is decreasing in q 1 : Proof. It is immediate to see that if the maximal admissible value of a 1 ,â 1 (q 1 ), solves problem (A7) when q 1 = , by the same argument the same is true for q 1 < . Consider next the …rst order conditions for an interior maximum of problem (A6):
As argued above a 1 ( ) solves this equation when q 1 = and is admissible: a 1 ( ) > ' (a 1 ( )). Let a Di 1 (q 1 ; ) denote the solution of (A8) for arbitrary q 1 . Note that a Di 1 (q 1 ; ) is decreasing in q 1 : @a
Hence, for all q 1 < ; a Di 1 (q 1 ; ) is greater than a 1 ( ), thus still admissible and constitutes so a solution of (A6).
Using the properties of a Proof. It immediately follows from Lemma 3 that v S (q 1 ; ) = â 1 (q 1 ) q 1 = â 2 (q 1 ). By the symmetry property of ',â 2 (q 1 ) must also be a solution, for all q 1 , of the equation a 2 = (1=q 1 )' (â 2 ). In the rest of the proof of this lemma it is convenient to write to denote 1=q 1 . Hence:
which is always positive, and so is
. Furthermore,
always negative since the numerator is the sum of three terms, and they are all negative. Thusâ 2 -and v S -are both strictly concave and increasing functions of . On the other hand, as shown in that same lemma, v D ( ; ) = (1 )
'(a Di 1 ( ; )) + a Di 1 ( ; ). Hence, using the envelope theorem:
which is positive -and hence v D is also increasing in -as long as is su¢ ciently large (and increasing for all 1= if (1 ) ' (a 1 ( )) < a 1 ( ), that is if < ). Moreover, where the second equality sign follows by (A8). positive for all , hence v D is always convex. Finally, for large v D ( ; ) v S ( ; ) = a D 1 ( ; ) â 1 ( ; ) > 0. Recalling that we have shown the same inequality holds for = 1= ; the result follows from the monotonicity and concavity/convexity properties of v S and v D established above.
On the basis of the previous …ndings we can now characterize the properties of competitive equilibria in the region < : We know from Lemma 2 that an equilibrium with q 1 = 34 only exists when , since for 2 ( ; ) (19) holds. Also, by De…nition 1 at a symmetric equilibrium with q 1 < the market clearing condition
has to hold and, in addition, a 1 = a D 1 (q 1 ; ) which, by Lemma 3, is equivalent to equation (??) being satis…ed.
We prove next that equations (A9) and (A8) have a solution with respect to q 1 and a 1 if and only if > , and in that case the solution is unique, As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, a D 1 (q 1 ; ) is always continuous and decreasing in q 1 . The solution of (A9) with respect to a 1 is also continuous but increasing in q 1 . For q 1 0; a D 1 (q 1 ; ) 1 while the solution of (A9) for a 1 yields a 1 0. On the other hand, for q 1 = , we have seen that a D 1 ( ; ) = a 1 ( ) and it is easy to verify 17 that the solution of (A9) obtains at a value a 1 < a 1 ( ) i¤ < . Hence if < equations (A8) and (A9) have no solution (such that q 1 ), which implies there is no symmetric ine¢ cient equilibrium with q 1 < . In contrast, if > there is a unique pair (a 1 ; q 1 ), say a is satis…ed. In addition, a mixed equilibrium might also exist at some price q 1 . At such an equilibrium, a positive fraction of entrepreneurs choose projectâ 1 where late producers are solvent and another positive fraction chooses a 17 This follows from the fact, established in Lemma 2, that < a 1 ( )=[(1 )'(a 1 ( ))] i¤ < . 18 If, and only if, this inequality is satis…ed we can always …nd S > 0 and D = 1 S > 0 such that the bond market clearing condition (A1) holds. 19 The claims follows from the facts that, at q 1 = q The resolution of default at date 1 occurs in three stages. In sub-period A the producers repay their debt, roll it over, or default. In sub-period B defaulting producers sell their claims to future output. In sub-period C the producers use the proceeds of liquation to pay their creditors.
Late producers default if d 0 > q 0 a 1 and roll over debt otherwise.
Late producers in default liquidate the firm by selling claims to future output.
Consumers use cash in hand to buy assets of defaulting firms.
Late producers in default pay out the liquidated value of the firm to creditors.
Consumers use the proceeds from liquidation of firms and other unspent revenue to buy consumption goods.
Sub-period A Sub-period B Sub-period C Early producers pay out min{a 1 ,d 0 }.
